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CYBERSPACE VERSUS PROPERTY LAW?
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK7

The prospect of applying the ordinary law of intellectual
property-which many associate with the technology of
Johannes Gutenberg-to twenty-first century innovations
bothers many people. Why be tied to the past? Why not achieve
a new and better future through new and better law?
Frightened by the idea of a patent on the human genome and
drugs developed from it? Just declare that all such knowledge
and products are in the public domain,' or require scientists and
drug developers to license their discoveries and products at
"reasonable" (= low) prices. Unsettled by the prospect that
books and articles distributed over the Internet will be tagged or
encrypted so that the authors or publishers can collect payment
each time they are read or redistributed? Just forbid the
newfangled devices (or contracts that consent to them),
declaring that authors cannot be allowed to violate the rules for
"fair use" or to profit from information that "ought" to be
available to everyone for free.2 Frustrated by a software license
that forbids the disassembly of object code in search of the
source code, which could help other programmers write
competing or complementary products? Just tell the author that
in the public interest the law will not enforce onerous terms,
which conflict with the public's presumptive right to engage in

* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The
Law School, The University of Chicago. This essay is an edited version of oral remarks
presented at a panel entitled PropertyRights in the 21st Centuy and is © 1999 by Frank H.
Easterbrook.
1. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
2. E.g., Yochai Benlder, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L REV. 354 (1999); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyight
Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELE TECH. L.J. 93 (1997); WendyJ.
Gordon, Price DiscriminationRedux: Of Copyight, Computers, and Plain Vanilla Copyight 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
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reverse engineering-and leave it to the judiciary to determine
which terms are too onerous. 3
I am a skeptic about the proposition that new developments in
technology imply the need for new laws or rules.4 I am skeptical
for two fundamental reasons. First, we know so little about the
effects of our current intellectual property regime on the
production and use of traditional intellectual property that it is
silly to suppose that we have the information essential to
prescribe new regimes for new kinds of intellectual property.
Second, when flailing around in the dark, it is much easier to
come up with "solutions" that harm the development of
intellectual property than it is to devise rules that help.
Ignorance thus should lead us to leave well enough alone. (As
Edmund Burke remarked: Don't talk to me of reform; things are
bad enough already.) I shall develop both of these propositions
briefly.
Consider for a moment the world of perfect competition in
classical economics. Price everywhere equals marginal cost, so all
decisions about producing, purchasing, and using goods are
both privately and socially optimal. Now consider the problem
for intellectual property: an idea, a book, a poem, or a piece of
software can be used without being used up. The marginal cost
of producing a new example, after the work has been created, is
not zero, but it is low-substantially below average total cost. To
recover its investment, a producer of intellectual property must
be able to sell at average total cost or more; but if marginal cost
is under average total cost, the price is "too high" to be socially
optimal, for the high price discourages at least some purchases
even though the consumer values the work at more than the
cost of producing an extra copy. That is the problem with which
the law of intellectual property grapples, and no solution can be
praised unconditionally.
Patent law, copyright law, trademark law, and the law of
contracts (of which trade secrets are a branch) create or employ
3. But see Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp.2d 1212
(N.D. Cal. 1999).
4. See Frank H. Easterbrook, COberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207; Frank H. Easterbrook, IntellectualProperty is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
108 (1990). See alsoHill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996);
5. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyight Law,
18J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
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property rights in information so that the producer of
intellectual property can charge more than marginal cost, and
thus cover the total cost of producing and disseminating the
works. Would-be consumers who value the work at more than
marginal cost but less than average total cost lose out; but if the
law were otherwise different consumers would lose (and lose
even more) because producers would not develop and distribute
as many innovations, plays, drugs, and programs. Just how much
above marginal cost should the price be? No one knows. A
patent gives the inventor the right to exclude competition for
twenty years, and thus to collect an enhanced price for that
period. Is twenty years too long, too short, or just right? No one
knows. A copyright lasts the life of the author plus an additional
period that Congress keeps increasing in response to producers'
lobbying. What is the right length of a copyright? No one knows.
A trademark lasts forever (or at least for as long as the product is
made and the name does not become generic in the public's
mind). A trade secret (such as the formula for Coca Cola, or the
source code of a computer program) lasts as long as the
developer can keep the secret. Are these durations optimal? No
one knows. How much use, and by whom, should be permitted
without compensation under the fair use doctrine? No one
knows.
By "noone" I mean more than just legislators and judges. The
best academic students of the subject disclaim knowledge. If we
do not know the answers to these traditional questions, how can
we hope that a new set of rules for a new century to cover a new
generation of intellectual property will be an improvement?
Who can be trusted to come up with better rules is a separate
question. Should we rely on the academy? You cannot pick up a
law review these days without encountering a proposal for
revamping the law of intellectual property. But there is very little
overlap between the authors of these proposals and serious
students of markets in intellectual property. Most good scholars
recognize that we do not know the answers to the current
generation of questions and therefore are poorly situated to
prescribe alterations. Bad scholars are less aware of their
limitations and make bold proposals-but these are the people
we should be most wary of.
Should we rely on inventors (or industry in general) to tell us
what protections are "needed"? Most authors and inventors
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think, like John L. Lewis, that the answer is "more" (just as many
consumers think that the answer is "less"); self interest taints the
response. Anyway, it turns out that inventors and authors are
lousy prophets. Most inventions receive no royalties; about ten
percent earn significant returns, and a very few have huge
payoffs. Most books have few sales. Most songs are never sung in
public. Similarly, most academic proposals for change in the law
(like most genetic mutations) have negative value. A very few
patents, novels, plays, songs, symphonies, and law-reform
proposals have high value, but ex ante it is hard to tell the good
innovations from the retrogressions.
What we do know about the market calls academic proposals
into serious question, however. If only ten percent of patents
earn substantial royalties, and if the bulk of returns come from a
few great successes, this means that most inventors are slaving
away in the hope of hitting a jackpot. It is the prospect of a big
payoff that spurs development. Most of the current crop of
academic proposals, however, recommend compulsory licenses,
reasonable-rate returns, expanded "fair use" doctrines, or
antitrust remedies that would cut down the return from the big
winners in the innovation game, without compensating the
other inventors. (Nor would we want to compensate the
inventors of products that flop in the market! Why subsidize
losers?) Curtail the top returns, and the whole structure of
rewards changes for the worse.
Most of the proposals in law reviews commit the Nirvana
Fallacy. They take the form: "The existing legal regimen has the
following costs and flaws; therefore my proposal is better."
Patents raise price and discourage use; this is a flaw because
some consumers who value the product at more than marginal
cost cannot afford it; therefore my proposal to [fill in the blank]
should be adopted. That's a nonsequitur. Every way of handling
intellectual property is costly and imperfect. All of these costs
must be toted up and compared; and, as I have stressed, no one
knows how to do that.
Even careful study of a question about innovations does not
ensure success. Other speakers have mentioned Chester Carlson
and his corona-charging patent, protecting the great innovation
6. See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery (Harvard University working paper, April
1998).
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that enabled plain-paper photocopying. Before Xerox
Corporation made a fortune selling Carlson's photocopiers, his
original licensee, the Battelle Institute, tried to raise
development funds by selling a fifty percent interest in the
invention to leading makers of office equipment. One potential
buyer was International Business Machines Corporation. IBM
commissioned a study by the best consulting firm money could
buy; the consultants determined that there was no market for
plain-paper photocopying, and after receiving this assessment
IBM declined to invest. This was a spectacular blunder, but only
in retrospect. Other, less noticed, errors occur when firms invest
heavily in technologies that turn out to be busts. Anyone
remember Federal Express's "ZapMail," a two-hour delivery
service brought to market at great expense just as businesses
were installing fax machines, or Polaroid's "Polavision," a
technologically splendid instant-development motion-picture
system that came out about the same time as the first handheld
videotape cameras? As Yogi Berra put it: Predictions are hard,
especially about the future. If firms that put millions of dollars
on the line cannot make reliable decisions about technology,
what would make us think that scholars with no money on the
line do well at devising legal rules to govern technology?
Perhaps, then, development of rules should be left to the
legislature. Elected representatives have political legitimacy, but
do they have the knowledge? Legislatures have no private
information that is unavailable to scholars. And recent legislative
efforts in the law of intellectual property have been adversely
affected by the tugging and hauling of interest groups.
For a long time, the statutory law of intellectual property has
been general. There was one term for all patents and one term
for all copyrights--all against the background of a common law
of contracts that is indifferent to the industry involved. When
the law of intellectual property is general, most people are apt to
support the best possible set of legal rules. Universities do not
lobby to eliminate copyright protection-even though that
would make it much cheaper to buy journals for their librariesbecause they are also producers of intellectual property. General
Motors pays substantial royalties to inventors, but it also receives
royalties as a patent holder. When people are, or are likely to be,
on both sides of a class of transactions, they tend to support
legislators who favor efficient rules.
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Not so when the rules can be made industry-specific. Recent
amendments to the copyright statutes provide special rules (and
benefits) for semiconductor chip producers, management
systems, and digital audio devices. Special patent regimens have
been created for drugs and plant varieties. Drug producers and
drug buyers reflect very different interests. Industry-specific rules
are the playgrounds of interest groups, and once factions get to
work it is predictable that at least some of the laws will favor
concentrated groups at the expense of a broader public.
These narrow regimens also tend to detract from the force of
competition among producers of intellectual property, and thus
magnify any shortcomings of the current laws. The traditional,
general statutes are contract-enabling: they create property
rights that set the stage for competition and contract. General
laws about intellectual property tend to promote competition.
Most patents, books, songs, and so on receive low rewards
because of competition-not because they are bad ideas on an
absolute scale, but because other people have come up with
many equally good ideas, and competition among them has the
beneficial effects of all economic competition. Newer laws tend
to be contract-defeating (substituting, say, a Copyright Royalty
Tribunal for bilateral agreements), which means that if the
statutes do not get things exactly right (and they do not), people
cannot transact around the errors.
How about courts as the source of newer and better rules?
Information about rules' effects is as much a problem for judges
as for other actors-worse, actually, and for four reasons. First,
courts are run by judges. Second, judges are lawyers. Third,
lawyers are ignorant. Fourth, courts are incoherent. Before you
exclaim that, having said this, I am obliged to resign, give me a
moment to elaborate.
Courts are run by judges. Judges are smart people, who
unsurprisingly tend to think well of their ideas. This is, alas, a
drawback, because, as I have emphasized, most new ideas are
bad. An academic who has a new idea subjects it to the test of
scholarly interchange, and it often takes decades to confirm or
refute new theses. A lawmaker who has a new idea submits it to
the political marketplace, where those injured by the proposal
7. See Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So Special AboutJudges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 773
(1990).
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can set up a defense (and an information campaign). A
capitalist who has a new idea submits it to the test of the
market-and as I have mentioned the market rejects (or at least
does not reward) most new ideas and products. But ajudge who
has a brainstorm can write it directly into law.
Entrepreneurs and politicians who churn out more bad ideas
than good ones can be evicted from office. A business manager
who does not get tossed out may suffer a great decline in
income, as bonuses or the value of stock options fall. People
recognize that because it is so hard to separate good from poor
ideas ex ante, the rewards for success and penalties for failure are
vital in business. Firms are at pains to devise methods to align
the interests of managers with those of investors.8 But what is
vitally important in business (and political life) is forbidden in
the judiciary. Judges do not reap rewards for devising better
rules, and they do not pay a penalty for failure. Even the
simplest reward structure-a bonus when your decision is
affirmed, a penalty when the Supreme Court reverses-is
missing. Viewed as legal entrepreneurs, therefore, judges are
unlikely to excel.
Judges are lawyers. Lawyers are generalists. They are
intermediaries and professional agents, dealing with a sweep of
problems, from drug control to antitrust regulation, that no
other profession covers. This means that even the most
intelligent and dedicated members of the bar are not expertsand I began, recall, by contending that even experts in
intellectual property do not know what rules would be optimal.
Trained to cope with so many different kinds of problems,
lawyers (and thus judges) are not steeped in the methods of
science. My point is not that judges lack degrees in biochemistry
or economics. It is that they are not comfortable with the
scientific approach of testing hypotheses by collecting data and
subjecting it to statistical analysis. Lawyers tend to think that
disputes can be solved by evaluating the credibility of witnesses,
an approach no scientist would adopt. Law schools teach future
lawyers to make and evaluate arguments verbally, not
empirically. But talk is cheap, hypotheses many, and
confirmation hard. Simply put, if IBM and leading scientists

8. See Canice Prendergast, CompensationPolicies Within irms, 37J. ECON. LIT. 7 (1999).
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cannot provide answers to major problems in the domain of
intellectual property, then neither can lawyers.
Lawyers are ignorant.This is just a different slant on the second
point, but at retail rather than wholesale. Because lawyers are
generalists (at least, judicial lawyers are generalists) who spend
most of their time on cocaine prosecutions and Social Security
disability cases, they lack the time necessary to fine-tune
complex bodies of rules. The broader the portfolio of subjects,
the more shallow the practitioner is doomed to be with respect
to each.
Courts are incoherent. Today there are more than 650 federal
districtjudges and more than 150 federal appellate judges. They
were appointed by different presidents and have exceptionally
diverse backgrounds. It is unrealistic to suppose that the federal
judiciary will coalesce around any one approach to a topic that
has been highly contentious among specialists. Although the
Supreme Court, with nine justices, is much smaller, it still makes
decisions by majority vote, and for reasons that I lack time to
develop here, any institution that decides by voting is bound to
sacrifice either consistency or some other important aspect of
the judicial process.
Do not despair! Ignorance is normal; the inability to specify
optimal rules is normal. What is the right price of wheat? How
many computers should be installed in a high school classroom?
What is the right substitution between automobiles and housing
for a family with an income of $50,000 per year? These
enormously complex questions lack right answers. When there is
no one right answer-and when people bear the costs of their
actions-we rely on those affected to make their own decisions.
Markets make it possible for different people, at different times,
with different information and different objectives, to make
different decisions. Legal rules often deny them that luxury.
Markets and the price system are at their best when knowledge is
diffuse and hard to organize. 10 Let me give you a theorem: the
more complex the problem, the more the "right" answer varies
over time and the affected population; and the easier it is to
address the problem by private contract, the less we should
attempt to resolve it by law.
9. SeeFrank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court, 95 HARV.L. REV. 802 (1982).
10. See generaUy THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS (1980).
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Actually, that theorem has a name: The Coase Theorem." If
bargaining is costless, then the outcome of private bargaining
will be a Pareto-optimal solution and the rule of law will be
irrelevant. Now bargaining is never costless. But technology is
moving in that direction. Today people communicate cheaply
and easily, and they can strike deals electronically at low cost.
Publishers could offer a menu of terms in the Internet for rights
you acquire to use and copy, say, music encoded in MP3 format,
and you could set a preference in your web browser or MP3
player about what kind of deal to accept. Patent pools, global
standards, blanket licenses after the fashion of ASCAP, and
other contractual devices have reduced the cost of bargaining
about intellectual property.
It is ironic that just as a global network and automation are
reducing the costs of contracting, and moving us closer to the
world in which the Coase Theorem prevails, people promote
more and more contract-defeating schemes. One is tempted to
think that they are concerned not about market failures but
about market successes-about the prospect that the sort of
world people prefer when they vote their own pocketbooks will
depart from the proposers' ideas of what people ought to prefer.
Next thing you know, why, economic transactions between
consenting adults will break out right in public view!
My principal suggestions follow from this understanding
about the relative competence of public and private actors.
Three propositions sum up what I know, or think I know, about
wise public policy.
1. Make rules clearer, to promote bargains. "We" do not know what is
best, but in a Coasean world the affected parties will by their actions
establish what is best.
It is awfully hard to know what the optimal compensation
package for authors is. When there is ignorance, it is best to give
more rights to authors. Why? Because if the best arrangement
turns out to be free distribution, then private transactions may
produce this result when the statute assigns the rights to
authors; but if the best arrangement turns out to be some fee for
distribution and a lower price for copying, it is extremely hard to
get to this state of affairs if the statute cancels the distribution
right. Private transactions could move the right back to authors
11. SeeR.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. &ECON. 1 (1960).

HeinOnline -- 4 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 111 1999-2000

Texas Review of Law & Politics

Vol. 4

only if the parties have contractual relations (for example,
patrons of the opera may agree not to tape the performances).
We must bear in mind the high possibility of error in the
original specification of entitlements-a risk especially high in a
legislative world dominated by interest-group politics. The risk
of error should lead to initial assignments that are easy to
reverse, so that people may find their own way with the least
interference.
2. Create property fights, where now there are none-again to make
bargainspossible.
One common response to a proposition of this sort is that
holders of rights in intellectual property are bound to use them
to cut out low-valuing users, or to squeeze profits from
information already in the public domain. I find it odd that this
response appears so often in the law reviews, where it is selfrefuting. Every law review article is copyrighted. This means that
the author could insist that the law review pay, say, $5,000 for
publication rights and that Lexis pay another $5,000 (plus $100
per "hit") for the right to make the text available electronically.
But of course authors do not do this. They submit articles
without payment,, from either law reviews or the electronic
services. Perhaps one could infer that the authors know
something about the value of their intellectual property. But
another possible inference is that when free distribution is
socially optimal, people will not enforce their property right to
withhold publication or demand fees. If you start from property
rights, you can negotiate for free distribution; if you start from
an absence of property rights, it is very hard to get to the best
solution when a charge is optimal.
3. Create bargaininginstitutions.
Computers offer many opportunities to do, at next to no cost,
the sort of thing the Copyright Clearance Center has tried and
failed to do for photocopies. Consider, for example, the
question of whether a publisher of content on the Internet
wants to authorize the making of copies-and, if so, the making
of copies that can be recopied, or a single copy for use on a local
computer, or only wants to authorize viewing on screen. All are
logical possibilities, each rational for some authors, or for any
given author at different times. How is it possible to specify
which is which and to collect payment?
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The answer lies in a convention-a protocol under which
each line contains its own instructions on this question, and
programs know how to interpret them. You are familiar with
such conventions. When your modem calls a remote modem,
the two devices engage in elaborate interrogation to discover
what speed to use and what compression and error-correction
algorithms are in place. An international standards-setting
organization agreed on the language; private firms all over the
world have decided whether, and to what extent, to use this
agreed language for communications. Some firms have come up
with their own extensions, outside the organization's framework.
Just so with the Internet's core communications protocol
(TCP/IP) and page-description language (HTML). Encryption
technology is similar. You may notice that when Netscape
Navigator enters a particular corner of the web, a solid key
appears in the lower left of the screen; this shows that the client
and the server have agreed on an encryption protocol, securing
the session. There are several available protocols. So can it be
with copying. A standards-setting organization could prescribe,
say, twenty different copying rules-sets of permission and
payment terms. There may be competing organizations with
their own standards. Each Internet server and client would
understand these terms and carry out the negotiation
automatically, remitting any payment to an agreed depository by
secure methods. Your future electronic copy of Moore's Federal
Practice may come tagged with instructions that tell your
computer how many times it can be copied, and to whom it may
be redistributed. And you will be better off for it.
These, then, are my propositions. We live in a world of
ignorance. We can expect ignorance about the full
consequences and optimality of legal rules to be as prevalent in
the twenty-first century as it has been in the past. We can expect
academics, legislators, and judges to have in the future the same
comparative disadvantages, vis-a-vis the market, that they have
had in the past. In a world of imperfect knowledge-that is, in
our world-you can benefit from clear rules, property rights,
and institutions that promote negotiation. Sounds like good old
property law. It is all that simple.
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